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historical conjuncture in Latin America 
— the leftward turn-away from military 
dictatorships and against neoliberalism  — 
his essay remains analytically productive 
for understanding Latin America’s urban 
futures, as Zeiderman argues here.
For the Latin American Futures edition of 
CROLAR, I had a written exchange with 
Austin Zeiderman, Associate Professor 
at the Department of Geography and 
Environment at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science. Our 
conversation explored the changing 
configurations of political ideology, urban 
space, and future imaginaries with a focus 
on the interplay between hope and anxiety, 
utopia and dystopia, security and threat. 
We began with one observation: despite 
the exhaustion of modernist paradigms, 
cities continue to be imagined, planned 
and governed as places in which attempts 
to secure the betterment of collective 
living condition narratives of national 
progress and sustainable development. 
Meanwhile, cities are also and increasingly 
understood as threatened by impending 
climate crisis, deepening economic and 
social inequalities, unprecedented health 
emergencies, and violent outbursts of 
political unrest. It is in this seemingly 
contradictory context that the analytics 
of security proves productive for thinking 
about the future as a space of both 
unfulfilled promises and imminent danger.
How has the opposition between 
“civilized” urbanity and “barbaric” rurality 
conditioned future imaginaries in Latin 
America? What are the historical links 
between urbanization and attempts to 
establish social and spatial order during 
colonization, after independence, and 
in other political conjunctures? In the 
following conversation, anthropologist 
Austin Zeiderman reviews historical 
perspectives on Latin American cities with 
a focus on the future. With an interest in the 
genealogy of urban imaginaries, he sheds 
light on contemporary preoccupations 
with future uncertainty and the specific role 
that security plays therein. Ever since the 
conquistadors set foot on the continent, 
he argues, the future has exerted affective 
power via hopes, threats, and visions of 
both utopian and dystopian possibilities.
Zeiderman’s reflections take inspiration 
from Fernando Coronil’s final essay, The 
Future in Question: History and Utopia in Latin 
America (1989-2010), which conceives of the 
future “as an open horizon of expectation, 
as potentiality, offering a hopeful sense of 
possibility characteristic of liminal phases 
or revolutions” and “as a receding historical 
horizon, a future in doubt, inducing a 
sense of despondency typical of periods of 
decline or historical depression” (Coronil 
2011: 235). Although Coronil offered 
this reading of “the present-day future 
imaginary” to understand a particular 
Security, Uncertainty, and Urban Futures:
A Conversation with Austin Zeiderman
Frank I. Müller
University of Amsterdam
Critical Reviews on Latin American Research | 34
of Spanish America, I’m often drawn to 
the different ways security and insecurity 
have been imagined in an urban context 
and to how threats have been perceived 
and faced by cities. From the initial urban 
settlements of the Spanish empire up to 
the present, I see a common thread in 
recurring concerns about the fragility of the 
city as a social, moral, and political ideal. 
We might even say that there has been a 
dystopian strand running through the long 
history of future imaginaries in the region, 
even those inspired by utopian visions. 
This line of thinking takes inspiration 
from Fernando Coronil’s observation 
about contemporary Latin America: that 
the future has become, paradoxically, 
both an unfolding horizon of expectation, 
possibility, and hope and a receding 
horizon of uncertainty, despondency, 
and doubt. It also follows Coronil’s 
argument that critical engagements with 
contemporary future imaginaries must be 
grounded in history. 
Although I have not really answered your 
question about what is responsible for the 
ascendance of urban security governance, 
I am making a methodological point about 
the need to think about the cultural, 
political, and economic changes of the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries alongside a deeper genealogical 
perspective that stretches back to the 
colonial period.
F.M.: With reference to Coronil, you argue 
that the future is both hope and threat. 
How has that tension informed the 
emergence of urban security? 
Frank Müller: Attempts to improve 
safety in cities and mitigate the effects of 
heterogeneous threats have buttressed 
the securitization of various forms of 
urban life, territories, and politics. In your 
work, and particularly in your 2016 book, 
Endangered City, you develop uncertainty 
as a critical analytical lens to read urban 
security governance in Latin America. 
Could you elaborate on what brought 
about this contemporary tendency? 
What are the historical conditions that 
supported the emergence of security?
Austin Zeiderman: Social theorists have 
frequently argued that teleological, 
evolutionary, and developmental thinking 
began to lose credibility in the late-
twentieth century, and that utopian visions 
have since been in short supply. The 
weakening of grand modernist narratives 
of progress has made way for radically 
different futures filled with uncertain 
prospects and undesirable outcomes. 
The rise of non-progressive temporalities, 
sometimes downright dystopian, has had 
a profound effect on cities. Amidst a global 
trend toward forecasting urban futures 
as futures of potential crisis, security 
has emerged as a dominant rationality 
for governing urban life. Although I find 
this argument persuasive, I think it is 
misleading in two dimensions: first, it 
lacks historical depth; and second, it lacks 
geographical specificity.
In contrast, I find it productive to highlight 
the long history in Latin America of 
recurrent anxieties that cities might, 
ultimately, be destined to fail. I’m not a 
historian, but in my reading of the history 
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traza (plan) consisting of linear streets 
at right angles, which together formed a 
geometrically regular grid pattern. At the 
center was a spacious, rectangular plaza, 
which contained public buildings, and from 
which radiated outwards the calles reales 
of the colonial elite. The linkage between 
the ideological foundation of empire and 
its spatial forms was further reflected in 
architecture, which physically manifested 
the presence of order within urban space. 
However, the extensive expectations 
placed on city-building meant that threats 
to the socio-spatial order were threats 
to the urban ideal as a whole, and by 
extension to imperial rule.
While similar arrangements were repeated 
in the majority of cities founded in the 
sixteenth century, it was not until 1573 
that they were codified by the Spanish 
crown in the form of the Ordenanzas 
de descubrimiento, nueva población 
y pacificación de las Indias. Although 
this royal decree was more symbolic 
than practical, it may have retroactively 
reassured the Spanish colonial elite 
that their settlements were based on 
principles derived from a formal, rational, 
and scientific body of knowledge. Here I’m 
thinking about what Patricia Seed (1995) 
calls Ceremonies of Possession, through 
which Spain attempted to assert its 
sovereignty in the face of competition and 
other sources of instability. Expectations 
for what city-making could achieve seem 
to have been inseparable from anxieties 
about that which threatened such 
promises.
A.Z.: I agree that amidst a global trend 
toward forecasting urban futures as 
futures of potential crisis, security has 
emerged in recent decades as a dominant 
rationality for governing cities and urban 
life. However, let’s go back to the first cities 
built by the Spanish in the Americas. As 
Ángel Rama (1996: 1) argues, the so-called 
New World “afforded a propitious place for 
the dream of the ‘orderly city’ to become 
a reality”. Santo Domingo was one of the 
earliest settlements, founded on the island 
of Hispaniola in the late fifteenth century. 
The city was destroyed by a hurricane only 
a few years later, and its governor swiftly 
relocated it to what he thought would be a 
safer location. Construction began on the 
new site in 1502 and it became the first 
experiment with geometric urban design 
in the Americas. While Santo Domingo’s 
layout is thought to have subsequently 
influenced successive city-building 
projects in the Americas, I think its history 
of destruction and relocation also nurtured 
future concerns about the fragility of cities 
established throughout the empire.
Between 1530 and 1560, hundreds of new 
settlements were founded, and I imagine 
this period of city-making to have been 
governed affectively by both expectation 
and anxiety, hope and threat. This takes 
on a material, spatial form if we look at 
the remarkably similar designs deployed. 
Through buildings and layout, these 
designs imposed a framework for the 
establishment and reproduction of a socio-
political order. In contrast to the absence 
of such planning in the Portuguese 
settlements in Brazil, cities in the Spanish 
colonies were laid out according to a 
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was most thoroughly instituted, people 
frequently moved back and forth between 
Spanish settlements inside the colonial 
traza and Indian barrios on the outside. 
After all, reducciones were not only a way to 
convert Indians into civilized Christians but 
also to facilitate the extraction of labor for 
the construction of public works, churches, 
and government buildings. As a result, the 
utopian hope that European civilization 
could be extended to the Americas was 
accompanied by its dystopian counterpart: 
the fear that racial purity, political stability, 
and social order could not be maintained. 
The city was where these hopes and fears 
intermingled most intensely. 
F.M.: So the idea of security seems to have 
been strongly set up by attempts to civilize 
the “other” in the colonizers’ view through 
norms, disciplines, and architectural 
commitments. How would you describe 
the moment when cities became identified 
as protective places amidst a hostile world? 
A.Z.: Throughout the colonial archive, 
there are examples of Spanish colonizers 
expressing anxiety about the capacity of 
authorities to govern future threats to cities. 
There is also heated debate over which 
potential dangers warranted the most 
attention. After all, the list of possibilities 
was long and diverse: floods, pirate 
attacks, earthquakes, Indian uprisings, 
volcanoes, epidemics, famine, hurricanes, 
and slave revolts, among others. What 
these threats had in common, however, 
was that they were imagined to originate 
outside the boundaries of the urban 
settlement. Whether attributed to God’s 
F.M.: Can you specify this further? How 
were the ideological premises of imperial 
order implemented in and through the 
urban space?
A.Z.: José Luis Romero (2011: 48) remarks 
that the origin of most Latin American cities 
was as a fort. These cities were imagined 
and built with the objective of protecting 
themselves against the potentially 
menacing wilderness outside. The 
perceived connection between imperial 
rule and socio-spatial order also influenced 
what was prohibited from the planned 
center. Everyone outside the traza was 
considered neither civilized nor Christian, 
beyond the boundaries of the rational and 
sacred, and innately prone to vice and 
immorality. The boundary between urban 
and rural, inside and outside, civilized and 
barbaric formed the basis of another core 
tenet of colonial governance—the racialist 
policy of two republics, one for Spaniards 
(pueblo de españoles) and one for Indians 
(pueblo de indios).  
Historians have shown that Spanish 
conquistadors brought to the Americas a 
set of ideas that equated civilization with 
urban existence. What, then, to do about 
the indigenous population that survived 
the genocidal violence of conquest? Seen 
by the colonizers as living according to 
the laws of nature, rather than of God or 
king, the Indians had to be brought into 
civilization, converted to Christianity, and 
taught Spanish ways of life in separate 
settlements known as congregaciones or 
reducciones. However, urban life required 
daily contact between different groups. 
Even where the two republics model 
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(2004) is the classic point of reference. In 
the 1840s, Sarmiento expressed concerns 
about the balance of power between 
the country and the city, not only for his 
own patria, but for all of South America. 
Sarmiento argued that all civilization had 
been centered in cities, where people 
naturally lived in a manner that was orderly 
and urbane. He feared that rural society 
and culture — embodied by the figure of 
the barbaric, uncivilized, and uneducated 
gaucho — was threatening the progress of 
the nation. While prior to independence, 
the two rival, incompatible societies 
(civilized and barbarous) coexisted, one 
in cities and the other in the provinces, 
the early nineteenth-century revolutions 
set them on a collision course. Sarmiento 
feared that the countryside would 
triumph over the city and ultimately erode 
civilization, law, and liberty. The presence 
of rural people and customs in urban 
space disturbed the racialized association 
between the city, civilization, and the white 
European elite. 
Similar anxieties about the post-
independence urban condition were 
expressed by other public figures. In his 
1867 essay, Miseria en Bogotá, lawyer and 
politician Miguel Samper (1996) depicted 
the Colombian capital as a backward, 
anarchic city plagued by material and 
moral decay —  a sick organism that needed 
to be cured. Though Samper also made 
reference to “barbarism” and “civilization,” 
his anxiety differed from Sarmiento’s 
(2004: 46) fear that “[t]his insecurity in 
life, which is customary and permanent in 
the countryside” would eventually invade 
the city. Indeed, we might say that, in 
will, to the power of nature, or to human 
agency, they were collectively understood 
to be caused by forces external to the 
city. But even when there was consensus 
about the primary source of threat, there 
was still disagreement as to how best to 
secure the city’s stability and permanence.
For example, Charles Walker (2008) shows 
that the 1746 earthquake that hit the 
viceregal capital of Lima was followed by 
debates about how best to undo physical 
damage and restore social and political 
order. Although the question of whether 
to relocate the city surfaced immediately, 
a rebuilding plan was eventually devised 
to minimize future earthquake damage. 
While this plan involved a struggle between 
the Spanish crown and the local elite, such 
struggles were overshadowed by the 
fact that the city’s foundations had been 
shaken, and the entire edifice of colonial 
rule seemed on the verge of collapse. 
Since the city had long been privileged as 
the symbolic and material foundation of 
the colonial order, and since the spread 
of European civilization throughout the 
Americas depended on it, this utopian 
vision was perpetually haunted by the 
dystopian fear that the future of the urban 
ideal, and therefore also of the imperial 
project it supported, was fundamentally in 
question.
F.M. How did this dialectic between 
utopian visions and dystopian fears 
further develop with independence? 
A.Z.: The influential Argentine politician 
and intellectual Domingo Sarmiento 
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A.Z.: The spatial shift I just mentioned 
took on a temporal dimension when the 
divide between inside and outside, on 
which earlier governmental imperatives 
were based, was joined by the sequence 
of past, present, and future. And whereas 
threats to the urban ideal eventually 
migrated across that spatial divide, they 
came to encompass aspects of the city 
that had to be overcome by the march of 
progress. Whatever jeopardized the city’s 
linear progression had to be reformed or 
removed through urban renewal efforts, 
such as those described by Jeffrey Needell 
(1995) in late-nineteenth-century Rio de 
Janeiro and Buenos Aires. When voices 
emerged blaming modernization projects 
for erasing memories of the past, they 
were drowned out by those who equated 
such opposition with stubborn racial and 
cultural inferiority.
After all, urban reform efforts were 
designed to show the world that Latin 
American cities had achieved European 
standards of progress and modernity. 
Doing so meant removing “degenerate” 
traces of the past - such as crowding, 
laziness, corruption, and Indians — and 
replacing them with symbols of the future. 
As such, these efforts aimed to bring about 
a new kind of person with appropriately 
modern conduct, appearance, and 
aspirations. The goal of creating a civilized 
society through modernization projects 
spread across a number of related 
domains such as health, transportation, 
architecture, immigration, infrastructure, 
education, and policing. Yet even in Buenos 
Aires, which became the symbol of urban 
modernity in South America, the pursuit 
the writings of someone like Samper, we 
see reflections of a wider shift in urban 
governance. In contrast to prior concerns 
with threats external to the city - such as 
Indian revolts, natural disasters, or rural 
demagogues - Samper targeted those 
originating within the “organism” of the 
city itself. 
This way of conceptualizing the city gave 
birth to a host of specialized discourses and 
techniques, from higienismo to eugenics, 
that sought to govern its internal socio-
natural dynamics. The establishment of 
professional police forces earlier in the 
nineteenth century was followed by other 
forms of governmental intervention, such 
as the criminalization of begging and the 
establishment of poor houses, which 
also aimed to regulate urban society 
and prevent social unrest. But problems 
internal to the city - its own government, 
environment, economy, and population, 
for example - took on renewed importance 
in the unstable political climate of the newly 
independent republics. Those in power 
across the region sought to exert control 
over an increasingly heterogeneous and 
illegible urbanity. Unlike the period before 
independence, when threats to the city 
were threats to the colonial order, at this 
moment the future of the independent 
nation was at stake.
F.M.: How did the temporal progress 
project of modernization play out in cities’ 
internal spatial orders and how were 
they tied to respective governmental 
interventions?
Vol. 9(1) (2021): Latin American Futures | 39
land, at first close to centrally-located 
employment opportunities and eventually 
on the urban periphery. As housing stocks 
were inadequate to the scale and pace 
of migration, squatter settlements and 
self-built housing spread. But economic 
opportunities were still widely available as 
the welfare-oriented policies of the 1960s 
generated employment through centrally 
directed development programs.
By the 1980s, however, a number of 
Latin American “urban miracles” began to 
collapse. States became highly dependent 
on external financing to forestall economic 
crisis, which forced national and municipal 
governments to withdraw subsidies and 
reduce expenditures on public services and 
infrastructure. Urban growth had already 
outpaced the capacity of governments 
to extend benefits and amenities to new 
settlements, and this compounded the 
problem. Employment opportunities 
shrunk as industrial production slowed, 
forcing millions to enter the informal 
economy as low-wage workers now 
unable to participate in society’s main 
productive apparatus. In the span of just a 
few decades, Néstor García Canclini (2001) 
observes, modernist hopes of creating 
orderly, rational, and civilized cities began 
to seem unrealistic.
As a result, the aesthetic ideals and 
economic goals associated with urban 
modernity lost credibility, and new political 
formations began to take hold. Manuel 
Castells (1983) shows that, during periods 
of economic crisis, a particular relationship 
between the state and the poor 
developed, which fueled the urbanization 
of urban renewal did not resolve concerns 
about the dark underside of the city, which 
was thought to breed immorality and vice. 
Donna Guy (1991) shows that prostitution 
was seen as dangerous, not only to public 
health and moral sensibilities, but also 
for its association with political instability 
and revolt. Stimulated by the anxiety that 
prostitution threatened the city’s drive 
for modernity, government intervention 
aimed to protect Buenos Aires from 
threats to the glorious future imagined by 
porteño elites.
F.M.: The modernization paradigm 
remained highly impactful further into the 
twentieth century. How did modernization 
and the governmental attempts to secure 
economic development associated with 
it meet less popular social and economic 
transformations? 
A.Z.: The unexpected speed and 
unprecedented scale of urbanization 
in the second half of the twentieth 
century posed fundamental challenges 
to modernist utopian visions. In the 
1950s, many Latin American countries 
had industrialized and internationalized 
their economies. With investment and 
infrastructure concentrated in central 
locales, capital cities experienced rapid 
growth and development. Around the 
same time, millions of rural campesinos 
began migrating to cities looking for 
economic opportunity and, in many 
cases, fleeing violence. They constructed 
favelas, villas miseria, pueblos jovenes, 
and other variations of self-built housing 
wherever they encountered vacant 
Critical Reviews on Latin American Research | 40
privileged isolated interventions and 
technical issues above city-wide planning. 
The relationship between migrant barrios 
and municipalities also changed, as 
governments shifted from a policy of 
exclusion and neglect to one of inclusion 
and regulation. Squatter settlements came 
to be seen as both potentially dangerous 
and politically necessary, and policies 
of repression alternated with efforts to 
mobilize the poor in support of ruling 
regimes. Eradicating favelas and informal 
settlements, as was common in Rio de 
Janeiro and Bogotá in the 1970s, gave way 
to “slum upgrading” programs designed 
to incorporate these settlements into the 
official city. Threats stemming from the 
unfulfilled promises of urban modernity 
had to be managed for social order and 
political stability to be maintained.
F.M.: How is this complex nexus between 
uncertainty and political stability effective 
today in architectonic patterns and 
polarized avoidances?
A.Z.: In recent decades, urban 
transformations throughout Latin America 
have compounded the uncertainty 
hanging over the future. Structural 
adjustment programs tied to financial 
aid from the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank pushed 
many countries into economic crisis at 
the same time that their governments 
were forced to reduce investments in 
public services, social programs, and 
urban infrastructure. Shifts away from 
manufacturing and industrial production 
increased economic dependence on 
pattern of squatter settlements. Social 
movements began to mobilize around 
issues of collective consumption, 
and they addressed these concerns 
directly to local governments. Women 
became centrally involved in grassroots 
political mobilization, which blurred the 
conventional distinction between the 
domestic and public spheres, challenging 
the definition of politics itself. The visibility 
of the poor - in both a physical and political 
sense - increased to such a degree that, 
for the first time since conquest, the city 
was no longer a bastion of elite control. 
The fall of military dictatorships led to 
democratization processes that enabled 
new political claims to be articulated 
from the urban periphery - what James 
Holston (2008) calls “spaces of insurgent 
citizenship.”
The problem of how to maintain security 
and stability in the face of such swift 
and widespread social transformation 
was met with a range of governmental 
efforts to control and accommodate 
peripheral spaces, lest cities would soon 
be overwhelmed by them. In countries 
like Peru and Bolivia, where rural migrants 
were mostly indigenous and cities had 
long been considered the “natural” home 
of whites of European descent, the anxiety 
surrounding the settlements springing up 
in Lima and La Paz was deeply racialized. 
By the turn of the century, academics 
and policymakers seemed to agree that 
Latin American cities were out of control 
and that modernist utopian aspirations 
were increasingly obsolete. What 
followed were more limited approaches 
to urban planning and governance, which 
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to reduce crime and violence and establish 
the rule of law, which empowered anticrime 
gangs and encouraged vigilante citizens 
to collaborate with the state security 
apparatus. In Colombia, President Álvaro 
Uribe’s seguridad democrática advanced 
the ideal of a society in which citizenship 
implied the personal responsibility to police 
one’s self and surroundings. As people 
were shouldered with this responsibility 
in the context of widespread violence and 
marginality, “a general feeling of fear and 
insecurity” became “all-encompassing 
and inescapable, part of the habitus of 
daily life” in many urban areas, as Daniel 
Goldstein (2005: 397) puts it. 
As violence and insecurity infused 
urban life, new political ideologies 
and future imaginaries emerged. In 
Endangered City (2016), I show how the 
progressive, developmental narratives 
that accompanied twentieth-century 
modernization projects were displaced 
by projections of imminent crisis, 
threat, and danger. I chart the rise of 
risk management as a technique of 
urban governance whose vision of 
the future is fundamentally uncertain. 
This accompanied the recognition that 
modernization campaigns failed to 
produce their intended result and that the 
promises of progress remain unfulfilled. 
And this had material consequences, as 
investments that may have once gone into 
infrastructure, education, and healthcare 
were redirected to programs designed 
to promote resilience or preparedness 
amongst a population of responsibilized 
citizens. Cities came to be seen as “at risk,” 
which, in turn, defined the problem to 
service sectors and on North American and 
European imports and capital. Neoliberal 
reforms were implemented to increase 
competitiveness in the global economy 
and to attract foreign direct investment 
by reducing trade barriers and creating 
tax incentives. Eventually, privatization, 
trade liberalization, and market-based 
institutional reform came to be seen as 
necessary or inevitable.
The social effects of these structural 
changes were felt severely throughout the 
region’s highly unequal cities, especially for 
those thrust even more deeply into poverty. 
Despite some gains in social inclusion 
and political recognition, economic 
restructuring and the dismantling of social 
benefits led to what Javier Auyero (2000: 
99) calls the “new sociology of urban 
exclusion,” whereby millions of people 
were relegated to zones of unemployment, 
violence, and vulnerability, which were 
then codified as threats to urban security. 
Rising security concerns eventually 
contributed to widespread patterns 
of social discrimination and spatial 
segregation as fortified enclaves came to 
represent a new paradigm of distinction 
- what Teresa Caldeira (2000: 292) calls a 
generalized “aesthetic of security.” 
In cities throughout the region, security 
began to infuse urban politics, governance, 
and everyday life. This was complicated by 
the fact that neoliberal reforms celebrated 
the figure of the flexible, active, and self-
reliant citizen who provides for his or 
her own safety, justice, and livelihood. 
Governments throughout Latin America 
began to promote “citizen security” as a way 
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American urban experience. Examining 
the multiple ways that problems of security 
have been framed at different moments 
allows us to engage with uncertainty, both 
conceptually and politically, and to see 
how it enables and constrains the urban 
imagination. These days, dystopian visions 
of the future seem all the more entrenched 
thanks to the resurgence of right-wing 
populism, the COVID-19 pandemic, 
exponential increases in violence, mass 
migrations and refugee crises, state and 
police terror, economic fallout, climate-
related disasters, and other acute and 
chronic emergencies. However, as we 
consider this bleak prognosis, I think it’s 
helpful to return to the last line of Coronil’s 
(2011: 264) essay, which reassures us 
that “as long as people find themselves 
without a safe and dignified home in the 
world, utopian dreams will continue to 
proliferate, energizing struggles to build a 
world made of many worlds, where people 
can dream their futures without fear of 
waking up”.
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